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Abstract 
This paper will approach the question of the social impact of 
the financial crisis from both the structural and micro perspec- 
tives. It will make use of data generated from small-scale 
studies of everyday life and statistical indicators of socio- 
economic transformations. We first discuss how the state was 
able to grasp opportunities presented by the crisis to reassert its 
hegemonic authority which has seen gradual erosion after more 
than three decades of economic boom. 
The paper then examines the new model of the Singaporean 
as designed by the state, ostensibly to enable them to compete 
in the new millennium. Although the hype is for a 'new Singa- 
porean', closer examination of what is actually required reveals 
the same compliant hard-working creature but dressed in new 
clothes of 'innovativeness and talents', current buzzwords 
unforgettable for their repetitiveness as broadcast in both the 
print and electronic media. 
The paper then proceeds to focus on the constituents of these 
state machinations to disclose the indeterminate nature of their 
formation/reformation and development. Despite being sub- 
jected to a whole array of disciplinary technologies, constituent- 
subjects are struggling to overcome their sufferings and sudden 
traumatic experiences brought on by the financial crisis, to 
build their lives as best they can. They have been forced to dis- 
card old ideologies in order to remake themselves and their 
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families in the light of what they have learnt from the abyss of 
the crisis. 
Indeed, new technologies touted by the state as their possible 
saviour have not brought only benefits. It is now too early to 
say how the virtual world hastened into being by the financial 
crisis will finally shape the lives of different groups of people. 
Case studies of young females and gangsters show that in their 
incapacitated position of disadvantage, IT will even bring 
unforeseen consequences. 
Introduction 
Over three decades of formidable economic performance and 
projections by diverse foreign parties that Asia's spectacular 
growth could go on forever once persuaded its leaders of their 
invincibility. Criticisms levelled at its authoritarian rule were 
swept aside as mere whining from decadent liberals with the 
argument that with our inherently superior Asian values, Asia 
can be assured of global dominance in the 'Pacific Century' 
(Mahbubani 1998; Koh 1998). Within this context, we can 
understand how batterings from the Asian crisis brought a re- 
versal in life circumstances that people were ill-prepared to 
cope with-if in fact they could survive the downturn at all. 
In this paper, I show the impact of the crisis on the lives of 
Singaporeans. First, we discuss how the crisis provided the 
state with an opportunity to reassert itself into the lives of its 
citizenry, ostensibly to create a new type of character that can 
compete in the new millennium. Second, the erratic occurrence 
of the crisis has led many Singaporeans to re-examine their own 
lives, hegemonic beliefs and world-views (such as meritocracy) 
that were previously propagated by the state. This second 
section relies on personal observations of the reflexive rework- 
ing of identification and self-formation. Some Singaporeans, 
even as the crisis gets translated into personal tragedies, have 
managed to adjust successfully on their own or with help from 
relatives and friends. Their own struggles and adaptations have 
encouraged the development of cognitive autonomy instead of 
Hing Ai Yun 
looking towards state initiatives. For others, the re-examination 
of the self includes doubting the state's performance and this 
has led to heightened demands for state reform. Incorporated in 
people's review of themselves and the state are demands for 
new forms of the social (referring to 'the sum of bonds and 
relations between individuals and events economic, moral and 
political-within a more or less bounded territory governed by 
its own laws' [Rose 1996: 3281). 
The Financial Crisis and State Re-legitimation 
The growth rate for Singapore in 1997 was 8 per cent but the 
figure plunged to 1.5 per cent for 1998. The suddenness and 
major change in the fortune of the NIEs such as Singapore has 
compounded the impact of the recession. 
The impact of the crisis, however, cannot be seen in isolation 
from prior trends of overheating, spiralling labour costs. Singa- 
pore actually initiated various measures to restructure its eco- 
nomy to a more hi-tech level during and after the 1985 reces- 
sion (Strategic Economic Plan 1991). At every opportunity 
thereafter, the state had regularly attempted to push the private 
sector to upgrade and automate. But alas, this was not an easy 
task. The industrial sector was shunning the incentives/tax 
rebates given for training, Research & Development and auto- 
mation. It was only in the 1990s when costs became too high 
that some industries were pushed to restructure by either 
moving out in droves into the relatively cheaper surrounding 
regions (including China) or to automate to take advantage of 
the generous incentives on offer. 
Rein venting the Singaporean 
As part of the restructuring process after the 1984-85 crisis 
involved production of higher value-added products such as 
R&D and the diversification into business and financial servi- 
ces, this new policy naturally entailed changes in the direction 
of human resource development. Singapore was forced to re- 
verse its elitist education orientation to one of greater access to 
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education for a larger part of the population. One consequence 
of the democratization of education coupled with accumulated 
confidence from years of unabated growth was the emergence 
of a noticeable segment of the population wanting to question 
the right of the state to enshrine a certain interpretation of social 
life as authoritative and to delegitimate or obscure other inter- 
pretations. Despite various political technologies (Miller and 
Rose 1995: 428) acting upon them (Tremewan 1994) to consti- 
tute the hegemonic form of identity-e.g. through the parading 
of various aspects of behaviour of Singaporeans ranging from 
unit labour costs and ranking on a variety of rating scales such 
as international competitiveness, labour flexibility (World Com- 
petitiveness Yearbook 1998)-there can still be found groups 
wanting to contest state invocations to reshape them to parti- 
cular forms of collective identities. 
Most crucially for the state, the crisis has provided a respite 
from this quite incessant public whining, and was timely for the 
opportunity to re-legitimate its claim to strong leadership and 
autocratic practices. ('State' refers here to the politically power- 
ful forces that have a monopoly of the legitimate use of 
violence. See Poggi 1978). For one thing, as the vulnerability of 
a people heightens during a crisis, so does their receptiveness 
for centralized commands directing a definite course of action 
for the future. Second, except for Taiwan, amongst the countries 
in the region, Singapore seems to be the least affected by the 
crisis, thus reinforcing the belief in state-enforced demands for 
stern discipline and willing compliance to 'hard choices'. 
For some time now after the occurrence of the crisis, the 
population has been assailed with rhetoric mobilizing them to- 
wards the new social being. Indeed, invocation of specific iden- 
tities and subjectivities is an integral part of the process of re- 
structuring (Dean 1994). Politicians like Senior Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew directly referred to the matter by calling for a 
'mental revolution' which was prominently displayed in the 
front page of the English daily Straits Times (10 April 1999: 1). 
What is this 'new' Singaporean who is being pursued by the 
state and on whom all the state apparatus must target? With 
one voice, state bureaucrats are in agreement on what they 
Hing Ai Yun 
desire the Singaporean to be in the new millennium. Previous 
calls by the state for the building of a 'rugged' and disciplined 
society in preparation for successful pursuit of the first phase of 
industrialization in the 1960s, though resisted by some, did 
succeed in becoming the hegemonic form of the Singaporean 
identity. At that time, Singapore faced a much more dangerous 
threat having been just ejected from Malaysia. Additionally, the 
steep pyramid of power relations at that time was conducive to 
successful incorporation. During the 1984-85 recession, a more 
systematic effort was made to come up with a new vision, 
Vision 99, behind which the citizens were mobilized. This reces- 
sion was immediately followed by organisation of the next 
'vision'. The question is whether with transformation of the 
power configuration to one of greater interdependence, the 
populace can be enticed to remake themselves as advised by the 
state. 
What Is This New Singaporean Producer? 
First and most crucial is the idea of the Singaporean as a vul- 
nerable person living in a risk-filled environment and thus re- 
quiring the cultivation of insecurity as a built-in trait. The 
preoccupation of the Singaporean should be on prevention and 
risk minimization because he or she is surrounded by certainty 
of nothing and the riskiness of everything (following the style 
of analysis carried out by Foucauldians concerning risk and 
governance [Simon 1987; Ericson and Haggerty 19971). Natu- 
rally, one way of facing risk is to return to the traditional risk 
broker, viz. the state. This reasoning reinforces for the people 
the concept of obedience and dependence on strong leadership 
which during the period of crisis has been made into the main 
bulwark around which the new Singaporean image could 
cohere. Opening the Tampines East 3-in-1 Family Centre, Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong 'underscored the importance of effec- 
tive leadership . . . noting that 'without good and active leaders, 
you will never have the hardware' (Straits Times, 8 March 1999: 
3). 'Strong leadership at the top remains essential,' says Deputy 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong paradoxically when explai- 
ning the need for a more open approach to governance. Most 
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I crucial is the view of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew that 'when 
I the final decision is made . . . some people's judgement counts 
I more than others'. Using the analogy of the hierarchy of the 
Catholic church, which has survived for 2,000 years, he conti- 
I nued, 'We need a core of people who are dedicated to the sur- 
1 viva1 of Singapore' (Lee, H. L. 1999). 
I It would be useful here to note Berlin's (1969) distinction 
between a more continental, positive conception of liberty as 
I 
'freedom to' warranting the fostering of individual capacities 
) through egalitarian state policies, and the more restrictive 
I 
I British conception of 'freedom from' constraints from authority. 
Given the tendencies of the state when strat'egizing for positive 
freedom to move towards tyranny, Berlin, having less faith in 
the virtues of state action as a vehicle of benign reform, advised 
against the promotion of negative freedoms. In view of increas- 
ing demands for a greater say, the Singapore state would seem 
to have opted for 'positive freedom' to ensure it continues to 
maintain the leading role in the organization of political pro- 
grammes and in mobilizing the population towards particular 
goals. This explains the frenetic mobilization of the population 
to confront the crisis with the sprouting of a great variety of 
committees. For instance, a huge committee called the Commit- 
tee on Singapore's Competitiveness was established in the wake 
of the financial crisis to prepare Singapore to face the next 
millennium. The Financial Advisory Group was set up to build 
Singapore as the financial hub for Asia and to beat off compe- 
tition from Hong Kong. Everyone has to contribute, but under 
the supervision of the state, for all this feedback is to help the 
state perform better, not to enrich people as participants of a 
democratic society. 
A second but related trait is individual responsibility, now 
viewed as a parallel system of self-rule (Foucauldian in origin), 
but which constitutes another cornerstone in the concept of citi- 
zenship in Singapore. Singaporeans have tended to adhere to a 
more collectively organized form of responsibility to protect 
themselves against expanding areas of risk as they assimilate 
more and more into global capitalism. (Various studies have 
pointed to the mass appeal of collectivized care for both 
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children and the elderly.) The state on the other hand still clings 
to the cherished orthodoxy of individual responsibility, even 
though it has to negotiate and accommodate rising demands for 
collective responsibility. The crisis has made clear the folly of 
relying solely on individualized networks of protection as 
represented by the traditional family. Despite railing against 
the imminent disintegration of the latter, and touting the neo- 
liberal ideology of welfare busting in the West-by such people 
as mrs. Thatcher, for example-(so commonly observed by 
authoritarian East Asian states [Chang 1999]), the Singapore 
government has finally reached the realization that it can no 
longer just do what it wants. 
This new responsiveness on the part of the state could signal 
the beginning of the birth of liberal society (Habermas 1998: 4). 
Although one could still sense the continuation of a deep dread 
of internal subversion as seen in the recent arrrest of opposition 
member Chee Soon Juan, the state no longer draws sustenance 
from this kind of emotional attitude. For some time now, for- 
eign subversion has begun to feature as partial explanation for 
cases of internal resistance. Western cultural values have regu- 
larly been derided as unsuitable for Singaporeans. In reviewing 
the emergence of the cyberworld in Singapore, Arts Minister 
Yeo reiterated that 'the politics of Singapore are for Singapor- 
eans to determine, not foreigners to influence in hidden ways'. 
Third but most crucial is the conventional goal of making 
people up to become ever more productive agents; not beings 
with rights to personal development and fulfilment. The man- 
tra is that Singapore needs workers 'with ideas, enterprise, and 
the will to learn', says Lee Kuan Yew in his now famous speech 
when launching the Productivity Campaign of 1999, where he 
called for a 'mental revolution' (Straits Times, 10 April 1999: 1). 
Institution-wise, the political technologies associated with this 
programme concern the establishment of the 'School of Lifelong 
Learning' system by the Ministry of Manpower (Straits Times, 6 
March 1999: 86). The aim is to constitute the citizen as an 
efficient, cheap input for business enterprises that can comprise 
a globally competitive workforce driving a knowledge-based 
economy. More crucially, 'every officer needs to be on the 
80 Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 14 2000 
Financial Crisis and Social Restructuring in Singapore 
lookout. This is no time for going autopilot.' The previous 
stance of benign neglect of 'drop outs' and the marginalized (so 
analogous to the Victorian/Edwardian view that primitive 
peoples like the Chinese were unimprovable [Mill [1859], 19751) 
has been reconstituted to incorporate everyone. No one can be 
spared. This explains the pressures heaped on schools to 
improve their ratings and percentage of passes in exams. The 
great revamp in schools, including granting them a larger 
number of teachers, began in January 1999. A sum of $4.46 
billion1 will be spent over seven years for the upgrading of 
schools. The hype is all about the search for talent, i.e. the 
human is viewed primarily as producer rather than beneficiary. 
Related to individual responsibility is constant awareness of 
one's obligation as a producer to maintain one's position on 
selected performance criteria and to be continuously subjected 
to measuring, labelling and by implication segregation and 
fragmentation according to the category salient at a particular 
time - e.g. 'race', rank (e.g. school performance), gender-with 
the state setting the criteria for what is 'normal', zero defect and 
what is deviant and unacceptable. Crucial here is the need for 
endless updates on the most recent information as part of the 
focus on risk prevention. This risk-knowledge process then 
gains its own internal momentum, giving rise to expanding 
teams of risk professional-bureaucrats. Risk has become an 
'imagined construct' that carries with it the whole rubric of risk 
governance incorporating its own technologies and program- 
mes (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). All these represent attempts 
to constitute the Singapore person with an inclusive identity 
encompassing all economic contributors, be they Singaporeans 
or foreigners. On the other hand, this exclusive version of the 
Singaporean as contributor and producer reflects more the 
interests of business and the state rather than that of 
individuals, who for some reason or other may not qualify as 
contributors but may only remain as undeserving consumers. 
Crucially, implicit in the labelling process is the legitimation of 
a corresponding system of rewards and benefits. Singapore's 
bureaucratic elites are one of the highest paid worldwide. The 
salary of the prime minister of Singapore is 56 times that of the 
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ordinary manufacturing worker compared to the US president's 
pay, which is only six times that of the average manufacturing 
worker's (see Asiaweek Survey of Salaries 1999). 
The continuous nature of this measurement and assessment 
is regularly reinforced in the mass media to underline the vul- 
nerability of Singapore's existence. After citing a long list of 
statistics to show that the economy is on its way to recovery, 
Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong warned in his May 
Day message that 'Our competitors are not standing still. What 
we do, others can also learn and will also do. Therefore we 
must always strive to improve, and to match the best perfor- 
mers.' The implication is that Singaporeans can never stand still 
or relax, 'We must press on with measures to make ourselves 
competitive.' 
Despite such repeated invocations to shape up to the parti- 
cular ideal image designed by the state, workers and different 
social groups have registered their views on preferred paths to 
be taken in the formation or re-formation of selfhood, as reflec- 
ted in their choice of the Singapore Vision 21.2 
The Singapore state is currently being forced into learning 
how to cope with the tensions confronting the liberal state. On 
the one hand, it wants to manipulate to retain power by homo- 
genizing, and centralizing through an unending process of rule 
creation for a complex, pluralistic social order. On the other 
hand, to stay viable, it requires the support of the middle class. 
To do that, the state has to deal with the inevitable centrifugal 
disruptive, self-regulating forces operating in the markets, pro- 
fessional agencies and communal organizations. Its mode of 
governance has thus to be forced towards multiplexity, though 
always to include backing by a coercive force. Nonetheless, the 
goal is the same. Unremitting hard work and a minimum level 
of consumption seem to be the fate for the majority. Wage to 
GDP ratio for Singapore is the lowest when compared to those 
of South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Straits Times, 11 May 
1996). 
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Strategizing for Governance in Hybrid Relations 
In view of these problems in the current push for the birth of 
the new social being, the state has to devise new strategies to 
cope with the now more demanding constituents. The birth of a 
multiplicity of localized resistance has given birth to corre- 
spondingly plural forms of rule. 
To cope with middle-class demands for more space, control- 
led participation such as 'supervise with a light touch', 'feed- 
back' (recurring phrases coined by the bureaucracy) and con- 
stant rule change represent measures that function to deflect the 
image of centralized decision-making. 
On the other hand, there is grudging accommodation to 
constituent demands, an extremely slow process of change as 
exemplified by the case below. Prime Minister Goh when open- 
ing the Tampines East 3-in-1 Family Centre (which combines 
daycare for children and the elderly) reiterated that community 
services could never replace the family's moral obligation to 
look after its elderly, adding that that they should be merely 
supplementary family care. Continuing, he noted that homes 
for the elderly and daycare centres were becoming a trend, as 
most families could not afford maids and were busy at work. 
He then admitted, 'I had no choice, so after 20 years, I, too, in 
Marine Parade [his constituency] had to set up a daycare centre 
for the elderly last year.' He then went on to warn that these 
services should not weaken family ties, 'We have got to find 
ways to bring in the family to help look after the young 
children and the elderly, even though they are taken care of by 
the centres.' 
Even under authoritarian regimes such as the Singaporean 
one, social configurations cannot be determinate but are more 
like an 'open-ended relational totality in which non-unified 
institutional orders of state, economy and society are articu- 
lated' (Bertramsen et al. 1991). So despite efforts of the Singa- 
pore state to demarcate politics from the rest of society, it has to 
accommodate criticisms emanating from ordinary people who 
do not belong to any political party, or who cannot be con- 
sidered experts in any field of specialization. Since the lines 
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separating state, economy and society are blurred when 
expressed in the daily lives of people, state-population inter- 
action has unwittingly led to restructuration or recomposition 
of existing structures, as argued by Jessop (1989: 41). 
As the state gingerly takes steps to figure the best way of 
handling an increasingly demanding population, one thing is 
sure: surveillance-based disciplinary forms of rule which 
underpinned institutions of modernity (Foucault 1991: 102) 
cannot be relied on completely. Also certain is the declining 
reliance on negative repressive sovereign modes of power. 
Once a hegemonic mode of governance in the early phases of 
Singapore's development, naked repression did prove rather 
effective in building a disciplinary society that could offer the 
highest manufacturing rates of return in the world. Proof of 
lessened reliance on coercive threats for compliance can be seen 
in the widening forms of measures to handle juvenile delin- 
quents that include, significantly, methods that were once 
designated as Western and 'soft liberal', such as counselling. 
Quite rightly, multiplexity of rule is required under hybrid 
relations of flexible production3 and by the burgeoning of 
divergent behaviours following the increasing globalization of 
Singapore's population. 
Contesting Self-formation 
To understand the social impact of the financial crisis, one 
could examine how the financial crisis is played out in the 
hearts and minds of people. One very obvious target group to 
study includes the population of retrenched workers. The 
extent of the retrenchments this time was most unexpected. 
During the first serious recession that Singapore experienced in 
1985, a modest number of 19,529 workers were retrenched 
(Lim, B. H. 1999). For 1998, the number of retrenched reached 
29,086, a figure three times that of 1997 (Straits Times, 5 April 
1998: 2). 
While globalisation has unwittingly introduced competing 
orientations to their lifeworld, it has also helped erode the 
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l 
I totalitarian mode which Singaporeans were plugged into. For 
I 
I 
some, the dire circumstances facing them during the crisis 
I have led to the erosion of their trust in state expertise. This allowed their own thinking to surface and thus take conduct 
I of their lives. They were reappropriating standards of beha- 
viour that were lost on account of the reductionistic structures 
put up by the state to surround them. Faced with the need to 
I survive on their own, the moral drives of the subjects reas- serted themselves or regained control over their conduct 
I (Bauman 1991: 51). 
Reassessing Materialism and the Work Ethic 
For those who had the most direct experience of the economic 
crisis through retrenchment, the impact was translated into 
something very personal. Despite class differences, retrenched 
workers on the whole generally feel somehow stigmatized and 
reduced by the experience. Most crucially, retrenchment now 
affects a large number of staff from all levels, but especially the 
middle classes, who have generally held an unwavering faith in 
meritocracy and the Protestant work ethic. The wrenching 
experience of retrenchment has led to the decoupling of hard 
work, capitalism and progress. These comprise the ideological 
underpinnings of Singapore's early industrialization. One 
young white-collar respondent from Lim's small-scale study 
proclaimed: 
It was the most difficult time for me. Not wanting to arouse 
any suspicion, I put on my usual working clothes when I go 
out to town but the feeling was not the same. I felt 
uncomfortable all the time. I did not want to bump into 
people I know because I did not know what to say (Lim 
1998/99: 44). 
Having been socialized to make work the primary source of 
identity in life, and having lived with flexi-pay, which 
overemphasizes the linkage between effort and reward, an 
employee can experience a great loss of confidence if 
retrenchment happens. This sense of helplessness was well 
expressed by a 32-year-old sales manager: 'I felt useless. I kept 
thinking and asking myself whether it is my own fault or not. I 
asked myself why must it happen to me?' On the other hand, 
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retrenchment may also help redirect the lives of the middle 
class: 
Being retrenched gave me free time to re-evaluate my life and 
goals making a scorecard to see if I have passed (Bank trader, 
aged 30). 
Being jobless gave me a chance to take stock of my life and to 
determine what I want to do from now onwards (Investment 
banker, aged 29). 
These reflections could be related to the middle-class rethinking 
the values of contemporary capitalism, which caused some of 
them to turn to alternative lifestyles, such as charismatic 
Christianity, fundamentalist religion and bohemian living, even 
prior to the current recession. The financial crisis seems to have 
aggravated this trend. This is confirmed by another respondent, 
a 37-year-old food and beverage supervisor, who said that after 
18 years of work in the same place, his work was becoming a 
burden and he was relieved that his retrenchment gave him a 
legitimate excuse to try out something new. His retrenchment 
entitlements could help him set up his own business. 
Ang's study on graduate employment (Ang 1998/1999) 
found that the recession has partly provided the impetus for 
this sector to set up on their own. This could be aided by the 
atmosphere established by the government to encourage young 
entrepreneurs, especially in the field of IT. Apart from regularly 
announcing schemes to assist such entrepreneurs, salary scales 
have been changed to make it less enticing for the middle class 
to follow the bureaucratic path. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
recently announced that the ratio of top and bottom pay would 
be reduced from the present 2:3 to 1.6:1.8 to motivate the risk- 
takers (Goh 1999)! 
Lim's study also found that blue-collar workers are more 
likely to accept retrenchment as something beyond their control 
and thus do not lapse into a sense of failure, perhaps because 
they never had any sense of being in control anyway. As a store 
assistant recounts: 
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I just tell the truth that I am retrenched. I don't want to give a 
false impression. There is nothing to be ashamed of. It is only 
retrenchment, nothing to be ashamed of (Lim 1998/99: 48). 
Blue-collar workers also have the tendency to look to the 
government to assist them, as they expressed the hope that 
more help will be forthcoming. MPs reporting to the recent 
parliamentary session also echoed these demands, adding that 
the little help given in the form of waiver of charges on public 
utilities, like water, electricity and gas, are quite paltry. 
As retrenched workers are not isolated entities but live lives 
deeply embedded in the fabric of society, their job loss has also 
impinged on significant others, like wives and children. A 
small-scale study by the Straits Times (5  April 1999: 2) revealed 
that when not dealt with carefully, misunderstandings have 
proven quite distressing to the children affected. For example, a 
contract worker was said to have caned his son for not atten- 
ding school. However, it was later discovered that as a result of 
his father's job loss, the child could not concentrate on his 
studies. Consequently, he was afraid that if he turned up at 
school, he would be punished by the teacher. Counsellors 
interviewed expressed concern that parents who could not 
frankly discuss their job loss with their children had added to 
the stress, because children are sensitive and would already 
have sensed that something was wrong. Children whose 
parents have showered material goods (substitutes for a lack of 
time and love) on them during the good times have a more 
difficulty in adjusting to changed circumstances, because they 
are used to receiving love in a commodified form. One 12-year- 
old child whose pocket money was slashed from $20 to $8 after 
his father lost his job had to borrow from friends, because he 
could not change his lifestyle overnight. On the part of parents, 
the stint of unemployment has given them pause for thought, 
especially about whether they should have let work take them 
so completely away from the building of family relationships. 
On the shopfloor, the impact of downsizing is neither 
straightforward nor predictable. Workplaces have often been 
described as 'family'. In fact, employers want their workers to 
feel that way about the company that employs them. So re- 
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trenchment can be more traumatic because workers feel a deep 
loss and fragmentation from social networks established over 
the years. When National Semiconductors retrenched the first 
100 of 165 workers it intended to axe in April 1999, one 42-year- 
old female worker cried her eyes out, not because of the job 
loss, but because she would miss her workmates. Says produc- 
tion operator Isti Komar who had spent 27 years of her life with 
the company: 'All my friends are here and they're like family. 
I'm happy with the retrenchment benefits so I'm not really 
upset about the job, only that I won't see my friends.' Most of 
those retrenched have spent 25 years with the company. 
Workers with over three years' experience receive a month's 
salary for every year of service and a month's pay in lieu of 
notice. This is the first time that the company has retrenched its 
manufacturing staff. In some ways, the workers that were not 
laid off were a bit envious, 'You'll never see that much cash in 
your life. It's like a great big hongbao [a cash gift].' 
The chaotic situation characterized by the financial crisis has 
been put to good use by employers and this has received very 
little publicity in the press. 'Some employers think only of cuts 
and nothing but cuts, and then sit around waiting for miracles 
to happen,' alleges general secretary C. K: Tan of the Metal 
Industries Workers' Union. One company used the excuse of 
restructuring to expand more than three times the workload of 
workers. In order to avoid having to pay the customary re- 
trenchment benefits, some employers have subjected their 
workers to such inconsiderate treatment that the employees 
voluntarily ask to resign. Examples of such 'cold' treatment 
include frequent transfers to variou~divisions, and changing 
job duties without proper training and guidance. Left in limbo 
without a proper set of duties, some middle-class workers 
would voluntarily resign because they could not accept the 
status of 'not working and yet working', having been trained all 
their lives to identify their self-worth with work and diligence. 
Other firms have used the opportunity provided by the 
atmosphere of crisis to rid themselves of relatively more expen- 
sive workers who are near retirement age. 'Many employers 
prefer young, foreign workers instead of older Singaporeans,' 
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noted President Idik of the Food and Beverage Industrial 
Workers' Union. His comments were reinforced by that of 
General Secretary Khng of the National Trade Union Congress 
(NTUC) Club Staff Union: 
I would like to urge all our employers not to discriminate 
against employment of older workers, especially workers 
aged 45 and above. Likely, such a call will fall on deaf ears as 
we all know that in today's situation, it is an employers' 
market. Hence, it is high time now for our government to act 
and address these growing concerns by putting in place . . . tax 
rebates . . . for enlightened employers who provide re-employ- 
ment opportunities . . . without discriminating against age. 
These emerging modes of discipline against 'weaker' workers 
have helped to 'improve' the compliance of Singaporean 
workers as a whole. According to some employers (generally 
those from the small and medium-sized enterprises), Singa- 
porean workers have been thoroughly spoilt by the long boom- 
ing period preceding the crisis and have become too recalcitrant 
on account of the tight labour market prevailing during 
previous decades of spiralling growth. 
Fortunately, there are also employers who have used the cur- 
rent crisis period to improve work design for workers. Unfor- 
tunately, these enlightened employers are in the minority. 
McDonald's has redesigned their cash registers using pictoral 
icons like fries and burgers to enable the older, less educated, 
less numerate workers to work at the cash registers. Of course, 
this will benefit the company as they can now rely more on the 
less mobile older workers compared to their more erratic teen- 
workers. The NTUC is working with the Productivity and 
Standards Board and the Manpower Ministry to devise simpli- 
fied work procedures which would be more suitable and less 
strenuous for the older worker. The state actively tries to pro- 
mote after-retirement employment for those workers who do 
not have much in the way of savings and who need to work 
longer to stay economically independent. In fact, uneducated 
men have found it difficult to find marriage partners in in- 
creasingly affluent Singapore. One consequence is a potential 
pool of dependants without family support in their old age. The 
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state therefore might have to pick up the tab for this group. 
Thus the consternation when older workers are unable to go for 
retraining to enable them to remain longer as useful economic 
contributors. 
In response to the state's stipulation of the need for particular 
talents to survive the new millennium, the people in contrast 
have concocted their own vision of what they want their lives to 
be. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong disclosed that in discussions 
with 6,000 Singaporeans of various occupations, he got the idea 
(contained in the acronym S21) that, 'They do not just want to 
pursue economic and material needs. They want intellectual, 
emotional, spiritual, cultural and social fulfilment.' It is incon- 
ceivable how a state that sees. its people solely as instruments of 
production could hope to implement this vision of the people 
that he promised. The past three to four decades of a booming 
economy has made it possible to reward the elites far above 
that of the average person. Suddently to reverse hierarchic cen- 
tralism to nurture spiritual and emotional values would imply 
a complete restructuring of the current highly disparate reward 
system towards one that better reflects social justice and 
humanism. This represents a great challenge in social 
engineering and social learning. It took Europe centuries to 
shift from a violent, manipulative, arrogant mode of commu- 
nication to one based on trust and stable relations (Elias 1994; 
Callieres [I7161 1963) as power configurations shift with the 
development of capitalism. 
Family Ideology Debunked 
For a long time now, despite the fact that 39 per cent of married 
households in Singapore are characterized as dual income, 
people have continued to be enamoured by the state ideology 
of familialism, especially the aspect that reifies the gendered 
division of labour and the myth of the male breadwinner. Part 
of the reason was that during the preceding economic boom, 
the two-income family could generally afford the services of a 
foreign maid. This proved a convenient device that allowed 
middle-class women to continue practising patriarchy in their 
family and so escape the role of domestic helper. For several 
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reasons, the crisis has compelled a rethink and perhaps even a 
reversal of this trend. 
First, everyone can now see that jobs will become increasingly 
insecure regardless of class position. No one will be spared and 
the causes of job loss can be quite unexpected. Women there- 
fore become more determined to get a job and to hold on to 
one, even after marriage. Our own study on the ideology of 
familialism4 found that although there seems to be a massive 
gulf between the older and younger generations, with the latter 
more determined to include a career as part of their conception 
of womanhood, some women have to give up their jobs after 
the first child due to a lack of affordable and accessible child- 
care facilities. The meagre wages paid to lower-class women 
make it inevitable that they give up their jobs after having the 
first child. Consequently, working-class women stuck with 
dead-end lives are the ones most likely to hold the view of 
themselves as dependants of the male breadwinner, unable to 
survive or be happy without a mate. 
Second, especially for older men (over 40 years of age) and 
their wives, job loss can be particularly traumatic because this is 
the group that holds most staunchly to the ideology of a 
gendered division of labour. Tan, a small entrepreuneur in our 
study on family ideology, who went bankrupt during the recent 
crisis, was so devastated that he took to gambling in the hope of 
recovering from his misfortune. On the other hand, his wife, 
who never used to work, had to start supporting the family by 
getting a job. She felt overburdened, partly owing to her auto- 
matic acceptance of the myth of the male breadwinner. As a 
result, she lacked both the confidence and motivation to sup- 
port the family and take full responsibility at this time of crisis, 
even though she had the capacity to do so. She could not 
psychologically accept that a woman could economically sup- 
port the family on her own. Neither could she accept that her 
husband could not earn an income, and could not continue to 
play the role of sole breadwinner. But somehow, through the 
support of relatives and friends, the couple managed to pull 
through and her husband finally took a low-paid job as a waiter 
in a friend's restaurant. But the experience of work has made 
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Mrs Tan realize that more plural forms of family functioning 
can also be viable. 
The 10 per cent reduction in the employer's contribution to the 
mandatory pension fund (CPF: Central Provident Fund5) 
instituted as one of the cost-cutting measures following the 
crisis, had eaten badly into the household budget of the average 
worker. As a result, more people have been pushed into taking 
a second job. Already, more children are working, abetted by 
the consumer revolution. Single-income families hive often 
been forced to rely solely on the male breadwinner because of 
the lack of cheap and accessible childcare facilities. They would 
typically have their male breadwinners hold more than one job. 
One example from our study is Toh, a 40-year-old factory 
technician whose wife had to stay home to care for two young 
children (one barely seven months old). One consequence of the 
salary reduction was that he had to work three nights a week as 
a taxi driver to keep up with his mortgage payments. It was 
tiring and made him rather short-tempered. He expressed the 
wish that his wife need not stay home to care for the kids, a 
wish we can interpret as the need for blurring of the gendered 
division of labour. The crisis has also brought home the taken 
for granted overlapping of the private (home) and the public 
(work) spheres, For a long time now, we have been enamoured 
of the separation between public and private with the assump- 
tion that the private world could effectively assume the role of 
nurturing casualties of capitalism and mitigating problems 
brought home from the world of work. This artificial division 
has led to a lack of interest in political matters because of the 
false thinking that home is insulated from what happens in the 
public arena. The financial crisis has spurred the demystifi- 
cation of fragmented reasoning to push for more activist, politi- 
cal orientation amongst disempowered people. 
In fact, the crisis has only exaggerated existing trends of de- 
velopment in gender relations within the family and made it 
that much more difficult for women to fit into the patriarchal 
moulds set up for them by the state. From previous discussions 
we can say that the crisis has hastened the democratization of 
family relations and has realigned ideology with reality. Like 
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Giddens (1999), we agree that family democracy is essential to 
the growth of democratization in society at large. 
Undermining Centralized Authority and Empower- 
ing Personal Capacity 
Instead of acceding to the state's demand for ever more pro- 
ductive workers, some people are more concerned with push- 
ing for another kind of mental revolution: a revolution that will 
free one from rigid demands emanating from a centralized 
authority now that the system has been found to have inherent 
weaknesses, even if these are rarely admitted openly. 
Declining faith in centralized authority was given an oppor- 
tunity for expression during the crisis. People were able to 
counter state demands by voicing their dissatisfaction with 
state performance, in a way rejecting the passive attributes and 
capacities associated with previous notions of the public. 
Even children are questioning if it is necessary to create an 
elite Chinese class as desired by the state. At a recent seminar 
attended by 200 students, a 13-year-old asked whether a 'non- 
Chinese can be considered a Chinese intellectual if he masters 
the Chinese language, culture and history?' In response to the 
current drive to project the 'Chineseness' of Singaporeans (seen 
as state-initiated commodification of Chinese culture as oppo- 
sed to the persecution of Chinese language education in the 
1950s and 1960s when Chinese communism was seen as sub- 
versive and Singaporeans were banned from even visiting 
China), another student queried whether Chinese Singaporeans 
would still be interested in learning Chinese if China ceases to 
be economically ascendant? Responding to global flows, it is 
not surprising to find youths more open to these flows, whereas 
conservative forces of the elites are more bent towards the 
building of boundaries and opposition to sustain their privi- 
leges and advantages. 
The state has also been accused of being inconsiderate and 
unfeeling, especially towards those citizens who are unable to 
contribute in any productive way. In this regard, the state has 
been denigrated for neglecting the plight of the disabled. The 
honorary secretary of the Disabled Children's Association and 
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Parents' Support Group and the Singapore Association for the 
Deaf recently wrote to the Straits Times (Forum page, 19 April 
1999) with a detailed listing of the problems of the disabled 
ending with the sad note that 'nine years after the publication of 
the seminal report on Social Services: The Next Lap, many of its 
recommendations have yet to be implemented'. In view of the 
current bid to build a knowledge-economy deemed as the 
solution to future crises, the frenetic search for talent to make 
the nation 'sparkle', 'you need the very advanced skills' (Straits 
Times, 20 April 1999), implies that lesser beings may just have 
no place in their own homeland. 
Apart from regular complaints about the hard-heartedness of 
the regime, other demands include whether the state should 
continue their monopolistic hold on decision-making that af- 
fects the people, especially when it has been shown they were 
slow to react in particular instances. K. K. Pang, press secretary 
to Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, recently had to 
justify why it took the government so long to come to the reali- 
zation that they needed to establish a special unit dedicated to 
the promotion of the financial services. This was in response to 
the observation of former president R. Lim of the Roundtable 
(private think-tank) that the government was not receptive to 
outside ideas because the Roundtable's suggestion for the 
setting up of the Financial Service Promotion Agency was not 
taken up until the establishment of the Financial Centre 
Advisory Group during the current crisis (letter to Straits Times, 
16 April 1999: 60). 
Specific state-initiated programmes have also been spot- 
lighted for criticism. Related to this is the critique whether the 
state is going about the right way to develop the knowledge 
economy. The strategy of lifelong training has been deemed 
inadequate by some professionals. G. Hosler, an IT expert, has 
alleged that the modes of computer familiarity passed on to 
school children (such as word processing, surfing the net and 
educational software) are such that, they 'will not qualify for 
even an entry-level position in a software company. At the end, 
the child might find it easier to get a job as a secretary but a job 
in IT? No.' He went on to point out that 
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The real irony and tragedy of this is that Singapore has made 
I 
I the effort to create the environment to entice foreign firms to 
I set up shop here, they do so, they create the anticipated jobs, 
and then because the talent pool is too small, they hire from 
1 
I outside. 
I His argument points to the failure of some (including policy- 
makers who have committed $1 billion to the School IT Master- 
I plan) to distinguish between IT developers and IT users (e.g. 1 programming of videocassette recorders). 
Business groups, on the contrary, have also targeted the state I for criticism. In a 'blunt message' to Singapore's financial regu- lators, industry executives have noted that Singapore still has a long way to go if it aims to surpass Hong Kong as Asia's domi- 
I nant financial services centre outside Japan (International Herald Tribune, 28 January 1999: 14). More specifically, in the words of 
J. Kalff, chairman of ABN-AMRO Bank (Netherlands' largest 
bank in terms of assets with Asian headquarters in Singapore), 
'Singapore is probably better off than many of the surrounding 
countries but not good enough to compete effectively with 
centres like Hong Kong, let alone London and New York.' 
New Forms of the Social 
Even prior to the current crisis, as Singapore proceeded with 
restructuring to a hi-tech economy, it was already casting about 
for a new meaning to what is 'social'. The crisis has affirmed 
again the need for the social to take on new content. With de- 
regulation and restructuring of market governance, 'social' has 
been defined primarily by international capital and its interests, 
i.e. individualization of costs. 
Not Territorially Bounded 
For one thing, the current hype about importing talent has 
fundamentally recast the meaning of 'social'. Whereas pre- 
viously, social was defined as territorially bounded, now it is 
taken to include anyone talented enough to contribute to the 
I economy, and that includes non-Singaporeans who now make 
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up more than 20 per cent of the workforce. Since the locals have 
not done their part to shape themselves into the mould recom- 
mended by the state, e.g. to have more children and take 
training seriously, the state had to expand the boundary of the 
local. Although the younger age group (aged 20-29) and those 
with less than secondary education have tended to view the 
move by the state to incorporate the foreign into the new social 
in an unfavourable light, the population as a whole recognizes 
the benefit of blurring the boundaries between local and the 
global. In a survey carried out by the Straits Times, 87 per cent 
of those polled agreed that the government should bring in 
foreign talents. 
However, it must be noted that since the crossing of bounda- 
ries between local and global has been discussed in the light of 
the foreign as main contributors to economic development, the 
state has somehow managed to assuage people's fears of more 
competition for the country's limited resources. Like the 
government, people hoped that the contributions of foreigners 
would bring them some additional benefits! It did not concern 
them that foreigners were also deprived of the right to make 
political comments on domestic matters. 
In contrast to the state's vision of the social, the people for 
their part are committed to a vision of the social which grants 
themselves the role of both producers and consumers, e.g. as 
expressed in the concern for the interests of the unproductive 
Singaporeans such as the handicapped and the old. This more 
integrated role of the social they have, in collusion with the 
state, denied to foreigners. 
Recasting Individualism 
Past affluence and the high level of rationality in Singapore 
society have also cast the citizen as a social being with indibi- 
dual needs and that image is now quite difficult to negate. 
Individualism for the people definitely now includes a balance 
between the interests of business and that of the people. 
Few now doubt that contemporary state invocation of the 
new talented Singaporean is associated with the enterprising 
individualistic self. In this neo-liberal view of the self, the 
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economic and the social have been cast as antagonistic and 
I 
comprise part of the process of desocialization of economic 
'I governance discussed by Rose (1996). Unlike their leaders who 
1 are adverse to the idea of the welfare state, Singaporean 
I workers much earlier on had already realized the urgent need 
I for collective organization in order to prevail against the risks 1 of living under advanced capitalism. 
I During the current recession, MPs have had to deal with 
I increasing numbers of retrenched in their forties and fifties who 
are unable to find jobs and who have families to support. 
Complaining that the means test of existing schemes was too 
' stringent, various MPs have called for the setting up of a social 
support fund to tide these people over their temporary difficult 
times (Straits Times, 18 March 1999: 30). Of course, the argument 
I 
of the minister for community development was that the 1 current schemes to help the needy were already adequate. 
While the logical immediate response to the current recession 
is to request more state aid to assist the retrenched, others, 
reinforcing the call of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) have recommended the establishment of unemployment 
insurance. This of course was duly rejected by the state, arguing 
that one-off schemes such as rent waivers and tax rebates 
provided adequate cover. To this, opposition MP Low T. K. had 
argued that rebates of $2 and $6 a month were too little to be of 
any real help to workers who are having to cope with 10 per 
cent pay cuts (Straits Times, 9 March 1999: 1). 
These sentiments were echoed by delegates to the NTUC 
Ordinary Delegates Conference held at the end of October 1998. 
Comments from President A. Tan of the United Workers of 
Electronic and Electrical Industries (which is the sector most 
affected by the crisis) reveals the ad hoc nature of Singapore's 
response to the recession, which not only indicates a superficial 
understanding of the structural working of capitalism but also a 
lack of commitment on the part of the state to alleviate in any 
meaningful way the deep structural problems faced by 
workers. President Tan said: 
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In the 1985 economic recession, one of the measures taken was 
a Central Provident Fund (CPF) cut. And this year, [the] CPF 
cut is also a measure to assist Singapore through this econo- 
mic recession. However, this is not the last recession that 
Singapore will experience. Thus, we cannot keep resorting to a 
CPF cut as it is only a short-term measure. We strongly feel 
that the Government and the employers should come up with 
an effective system to tackle the economic recession which 
must not necessarily be through wage or CPF cuts. 
Moreover, pay cut or fee waivers have been applied in an 
apparently 'equal' manner, e.g. a 10 per cent deduction for all 
categories of workers. However, closer examination reveals the 
unequal burdens suffered by the lower categories of the work- 
force, as noted by Vice-president S. H. Law of the Singapore 
Manual and Mercantile Workers' Union: 'In truth, we are not 
paid equally. Even with a 10 point reduction in CPF, high level 
staff can still enjoy a golf game or two.' There is therefore a 
perception of the need for more systemic measures to deal with 
recessions and not simply to take the easy way out by cutting 
wages. 
Until recently, constituents willingly accepted the definition 
of themselves as economic producers. Consequently, it was 
legitimate to spend minimal resources on those who were con- 
sidered unproductive. However, after some decades of fast 
growth, as people become less subject to immediate material 
necessities, it can be expected that the formation of their person- 
ality has tended to become increasingly divorced from these 
necessities. 
Collective consumption in Singapore has been stringently 
controlled, with potential productive labour having first 
priority. For instance, ample resources have been accorded to 
those identified as the elite students to develop their symbolic 
capital (via scholarships, the gifted children's programme, etc.) 
whilst far fewer public resources have been made available to 
the less capable. Of the NIEs where information has been made 
available, Singapore's expenditure on higher education far 
exceeded that of other nations, whilst expenditure on primary 
education is relatively more sparing (see World Development 
Indicators 1998). The current crisis involving capital's inter- 
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national redeployment has indeed challenged the Fordist com- 
promise (where jobs were generated in exchange for industrial 
peace) achieved during the early phase of Singapore's industri- 
alization. To avoid social instability caused by the production of 
a segment of new poor (euphemistically labelled 'early retirees', 
who are unwanted because young educated immigrants are 
more efficient and cheaper), Singapore may need to construct a 
new mode of regulation to make them less vulnerable to the 
vagaries of international capital. 
Expanding the Social via the Virtual 
Under modern conditions of both communication technology 
and the social engineering of self-organization for identity, the 
socially local is no longer necessarily geographically near. The 
hegemonic nature of capitalist technology, which has brought 
about unprecedented mastery of space and time, has provided 
for incorporation of material that is alien. 
The opening up of new spaces and new time has also simul- 
taneously exponentially expanded the horizon of powerless 
people like women, whose options for partners have expanded 
tremendously. However, as imagined worlds of financescapes 
and ideoscapes (Appadurai 1990) develop their own dynamics 
and start to govern their creators-for whom it becomes 
impossible to distinguish reality and virtuality-the conse- 
quence is indeterminate, containing both promises and threats. 
On the one hand, workers and students have benefited from 
access to the cyberworld made available by the state and 
employers who have bought into the myth of IT as the solution 
to the problems of the current recession. Unfortunately, players 
have at the same time been exposed to relatively new and 
unforeseen threats to personal safety and security because of 
the comparative novelty of the experience. 
Under such circumstances, many are the reports detailing 
how women have been conned into sending money and pro- 
posals to bogus virtual suitors. Just one example is that of 28- 
year-old bank clerk Maria Ooi, who had transferred US$22,502 
to her own account so she could lend the money to her Cana- 
dian friend whom she had met over the Internet. She then paid 
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off a phone bill of $8,000 she chalked up talking to him, then 
wired $10,683 to him as she had done countless times before 
(Straits Times, 29 December 1998: 1). 
Finally, access to cyberspace has provided opportunities for 
mutual communication amongst like-minded members of 
peripheral groups apart from an alternate escape route from the 
somewhat strict control of the media exercised by the state. For 
instance, material on illegal societies, such as the Ang Soon 
Tong gang, has been posted on the Internet in chat rooms and 
even on active bilingual sites featuring tatooed youths, girls and 
slogans glorifying the secret society. According to Inspector E. 
S. Ang of the Criminal Crime Branch Team, it is difficult to 
regulate these sites due to the uncertain identities of their origi- 
riators. However, amid the hype spotlighting massive state 
expenditures on the building of IT infrastructures (both soft and 
hardware), it must be noted that the availability of IT to the 
masses is still constrained by its high costs, relative to the 
comparatively low wages received by the average worker. For 
instance, the median pay .of workers was only S$1,625 in 1997 
(Singapore Statistical Highlights). Even small start-ups have 
reported difficulty in conducting Internet business, as banks 
(except American Express, which charges a high commission) 
are unwilling to support e-commerce through the use of credit 
cards. 
To combat the problem of access for those with less resour- 
ces, service providers such as the Singapore Cable Vision had 
recently to rethink its pricing structure in order to expand its 
market. Their market surveys found that clients with lower- 
level incomes would only sign up if the monthly prices were 
lowered. At present, only about 20 per cent of the 820,000 cable- 
ready homes subscribe to cable. 
Conclusion 
The immediate impact of the Asian crisis was to generate panic 
and a sense of vulnerability in the people. Another result has 
been the accelerated opening of a window of opportunity for 
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the state to reassert its authority, which had slowly eroded with 
I the years of affluence and the accumulation of confidence by its 
I 
I citizens. On the heels of the crisis, the Singapore state has 
I 
I engaged in frenetic mobilization to call for an overhaul of 
1 people to fit its designated mould, if they want to survive the 
crisis. However, globalization and extreme internationalization 
1 of the Singapore economy have generated a wide variety of desires and demands. This has made it imperative that new 
modes of governance be invented and broadened to include 
more hybrid modes that incorporate both coercion and a whole 
host of political and disciplinary technologies. 
People, on the other hand, faced with the sudden collapse of 
1 their material world and aspirations which had been built on 
conventional ideologies learnt from a bygone era, have been 
forced to rethink and readjust to new realities brought on by the 
crisis. In the process, some old ideologies such as patriarchy 
have to be dumped while beliefs consonant with the new reality 
have to be taken on board. Whilst previous decades of 
economic boom have encouraged the flourishing of liberal indi- 
vidualism, the many new threats and uncertainties brought 
about by flexible production-accompanied by new managerial 
practices such as downsizing and overproduction of the middle 
classes-have forced a recasting of individualism to produce a 
demand for a more co-operative basis of organization. Changed 
notions of the social have also begun to emerge and there is not 
much that anyone, including authoritarian governments, can do 
to stop that trend. Whilst access to cyberspace has facilitated 
escape from hegemonic standards set by the state, it has also 
led to subversion of individual integrity. 
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Notes 
1. All dollars are denominated in Singapore dollars (US$1 = S$1.722). 
2. During the crisis, as part of the project to mobilize the citizens to 'sacrifice' 
for the nation, the state garnered the views of 6,000 Singaporeans 
including businessmen, professionals, grassroots leaders, community 
groups, unionists and students from institutions of higher learning to 
produce what is now categorized as Singapore Vision 21, which purports 
to promulgate what people want for their society. These desires were 
grouped into the following four goals: 
every Singaporean matters (note: not only the leaders) 
opportunities for all (note: not only the talented) 
sense of belonging (note: even for non-producers) 
* actively making a difference to society (note: the views of everyone 
are equally significant). 
3. Refers to the new corporate and industrial regime brought on by pres- 
sures from heightened global competitiveness. It is characterized by 
accelerating product cycles, more 'flexible' forms of work and inter-firm 
interaction (eg. greater use of outsourcing. See Sabel1982). 
4. This study is in process and looks at family ideology and the mother- 
daughter relationship of various classes and ethnic groups in Singapore. 
5. Before the 1985 recession, the total CPF rate stood at 50 per cent, with 
employees contributing 25 per cent and employers matching this. In 
1986, the employer's share was reduced to 10 per cent. It was not restored 
fully and reached 20 per cent in 1994. The employee's share, on the other 
hand, was gradually reduced from 1988 onwards until it reached 20 per 
cent in 1994. 
6. There are now 530,000 foreigners out of a totaI of about 1.93 million in the 
workforce (up from 1.4 million in 1988). Out of this figure, 80,000 are 
higher skilled and better educated (including professionals) while 
450,000 (including 100,000 domestic helpers) comprise lower-level 
workers. Between 1994-97, the annual increase of foreign workers was to 
the tune of 15 per cent, with a net inflow of 50,000 (out of which 7,000 are 
professional workers). The aim of taking in so-called foreign talent was to 
double the number of the skilled and professional strata. It was estimated 
by the Department of Statistics that without this foreign input, Singa- 
pore's GDP growth for 1996 would be 2.2 per cent lower, that is 5.3 
instead of 7.5 per cent. 
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